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SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS ARE NOT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED 
Robert E. Ross & Barrett Anderson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution is silent on the method for electing 
representatives, as it only requires the apportionment of seats in 
the House following the decennial census. Congress and the states 
determine many of the electoral rules affecting the House, such as 
the method of apportioning seats, the manner of electing 
representatives, and the size of the House. As such, Congress, the 
courts, and state legislatures have become central actors in 
determining apportionment law that dictates the institutional 
design and representative nature of the House. After ratification 
of the Constitution, states experimented with different methods 
for electing representatives based on representational 
preferences and needs. It was Congress that ultimately required 
that states uniformly use single-member districts, creating 
institutional rules that profoundly affected the composition of the 
House of Representatives. Article 1, Section 4 stipulates that 
“Congress may at any time by law make or alter [election] 
regulations.” Does this language include the ability to require 
states to adopt a uniform method for electing representatives? 
Can the single-member district requirement be constitutionally 
justified through an understanding of congressional power to 
make electoral regulations? These questions are the result of the 
broad language in the Elections Clause. Given the lack of judicial 
interpretation on this matter, understanding the constitutional 
development of single-member districts requires a focus on the 
constructed meaning of the Constitution that emerged within the 
political debates over preferred electoral rules. 
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Gill v. Whitford is a recent case of the Supreme Court 
entering the “political thicket” of redistricting. The case centers 
on Wisconsin’s redistricting plan, following the 2010 census, 
passed by a Republican-controlled legislature in 2011. A district 
court declared the plan violated the Constitution because it 
favored one party, while disadvantaging the other—an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Voting results in the 
Wisconsin elections help substantiate this claim because, in 2012 
and 2014, Democrats received more votes (just over a majority) 
than Republicans, yet the Democrats only won 39 of the 99 seats 
in the state-assembly. Wisconsin Republicans maintained that 
they did not intentionally create partisan districts, but the 
disparity emerged because of a natural geographic advantage they 
have in rural areas, where their voters are evenly distributed, 
compared to the Democrats, who are clustered in urban areas.1 In 
this case, drawing geographical district lines mattered for the 
partisan composition and representativeness of the state 
legislature. 
While Gill v. Whitford focused on state-level redistricting, in 
2015, the Court ruled on a case dealing with congressional 
redistricting and the use of independent redistricting commissions 
to reduce partisan gerrymandering at the federal level. In Arizona 
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, the Supreme Court considered if a popular initiative 
could empower an independent commission to draw district lines 
for the state. State legislatures are constitutionally empowered to 
determine “the manner of holding elections” for the House, 
including drawing district lines. Writing for the 5-4 majority, Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg argued that the “Legislature” in the Elections 
Clause could also refer to any body capable of making laws, 
including “the people.”2 According to this understanding, the 
concept of legislature was expanded, allowing for additional 
avenues to drawing district lines other than state legislatures, the 
common practice based on the interpretation of the Elections 
Clause. Like many previous cases, the Court’s ruling constructs an 
 
 1. Gill v. Whitford, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/whitford-v-gill. 
 2. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 
2652 (2015). See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore & John Yoo, People ≠ Legislature, 39 HARV. 
L. REV. 341, 342 (2016) (commenting on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona State 
Legislature and arguing that “the Court read the word ‘Legislature’ out of the Elections 
Clause.”). 
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understanding of Article I, Section 4 and the scope of 
congressional power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause, 
specifically related to creating constituencies and determining the 
nature of congressional representation. 
These cases are but two examples of the Court’s engagement 
with the concept of representation and how it is determined 
through institutional design. Currently, the House of 
Representatives utilizes a system of single-member districts as the 
required method for electing members to the House. That is, 
every state is apportioned representatives based on population, 
and each state is divided into a corresponding number of 
geographically based voting districts, with one representative 
elected from each district. The decision to require single-member 
districts raises important questions regarding how and where 
these geographic voting boundaries are drawn. As seen in Gill v. 
Whitford, this matters for who votes, for whom they get to vote, 
and the electoral connection between voter and representative. 
When the Court is called upon to adjudicate cases involving 
redistricting, it primarily addresses the process and outcomes of 
drawing (or redrawing) district lines. However, the deeper 
institutional question of the origin and constitutionality of single-
member districts is never addressed. 
Scholarship on the development of single-member districts in 
the United States has rightly focused on the 1842 Apportionment 
Act, which was the first time Congress required states adopt a 
particular method for electing representatives. This Act was 
important in the development of Article I, Section 4 because the 
Whig Party’s interpretation of the Times, Manner, and Places 
Clause shifted power from the states to Congress in determining 
the manner of electing representatives. Accordingly, research has 
provided explanations for why the Whigs pursued this particular 
electoral reform, including arguments from partisanship or self-
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interest3 and concern for representation.4 These accounts are 
useful for understanding an important moment in the institutional 
development of the House of Representatives and the nature of 
federalism. However, they do not capture subsequent 
developments beyond the 1840s and how the 1842 understanding 
of the Election Clause remained settled, even amidst legal 
challenges that emerged during the “apportionment revolution” 
of the 1960s. 
This article will focus on two separate but interrelated 
developments: 1) the origin of using single-member districts as a 
method of representation and 2) how the meaning of the Election 
Clause was settled to legitimize congressional authority to require 
states to use single-member districts. The Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Election Clause, while important for 
understanding contemporary voting rights, does not address the 
broader, historical meaning of the Clause. In other words, relying 
on the Supreme Court for understanding the Elections Clause 
provides relatively little guidance for understanding the origin 
and constitutionality of the congressional single-member district 
mandate.5 In this article, we provide a brief historical account of 
the origin of using single-member districts as a method of political 
representation, a discussion of the development of the Election 
Clause and how Congress interpreted it to justify their 
requirement that states use single-member districts, and an 
account of how the Supreme Court has yet to address the 
constitutionality of congressional power over the method of 
electing representatives. Answering the questions of the origin 
and constitutionality of the single-member district requirement 
has important bearing on the concept of representation, as single-
 
 3. See CHARLES A. KROMKOWSKI, RECREATING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 
RULES OF APPORTIONMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT, 1770-1870 (2002); ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: 
REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776–1850 (1987); Martin H. Quitt, 
Congressional (Partisan) Constitutionalism: The Apportionment Act Debates of 1842 and 
1844, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 627 (2008); Michele Rosa-Clot, The Apportionment Act of 
1842: ‘An Odious Use of Authority’, 31 PARLIAMENTS, ESTATES & REPRESENTATION 33 
(2011); Johanna Nicol Shields, Whigs Reform the ‘Bear Garden’: Representation and the 
Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 355 (1985); Bernard Ivan Tamas, A 
Divided Political Elite: Why Congress Banned Multimember Districts in 1842, 28 NEW 
POLI. SCI. 23 (2006). 
 4. Robert E. Ross, Recreating the House: The 1842 Apportionment Act and the Whig 
Party’s Reconstruction of Representation, 49 POLITY 408 (2017). 
 5. Jamal Greene, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders under the Elections Clause, 114 
YALE L. J. 1021 (2005). 
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member districts often fail to provide representation to political 
and ethnic minority groups.6 It also has implications for 
understanding the political process by which constitutional 
meaning is constructed absent judicial interpretations.7 
I. ORIGIN OF SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS 
After independence from Britain was declared, states began 
developing their own constitutions, and, following English Whig 
political thought (and John Locke), many of them limited the 
prerogatives of the governor and ensured the legislatures reigned 
supreme because it embodied the people. American legislatures 
were to be the government, and the people were empowered 
through legislative bodies and their representatives. The nature 
and scope of representation was perhaps the most important 
political controversy leading up to the revolutionary war and 
after. The concept of representation emerged from the 
impossibility of convening the whole people to make legislative 
decisions, particularly in areas that were both demographically 
and geographically dispersed. The challenge became designing a 
constitutional system that translated the voice of the people to the 
legislative body through representation, one that could not be 
based on English institutional design. 
A system of representation could not be derived from 
experience with English representation. If anything, the 
American system of representation needed to learn from the 
failures of the English model. The British system of 
representation was designed to accommodate limited geographic 
and social mobility and a constituency that was relatively small 
and static. Geographically based representation, then, was 
utilized to represent geographically distinct communities.8 During 
 
 6. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES/REAL VOICES: THE CASE OF 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES (1993) (arguing 
that proportional representation where multiple legislators are elected from a district is a 
fairer, more representative approach to democratic elections); LANI GUINIER, THE 
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE 
DEMOCRACY (1991) (arguing for proportional voting as a means for increasing the 
representation of historically underrepresented communities). 
 7. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (exploring the history of 
constitutionalism and how non-judicial bodies have understood and applied the principles 
of the constitution). 
 8. ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF A CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 69 (2005). 
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the seventeenth century, as the population increased and 
mobilized, England’s existing system of representation derived 
from community-based district lines no longer sufficed. Although 
England used a form of electoral districts, the problem of rotten 
boroughs and a small number of those choosing representatives 
created systematic inequalities in representation. The English 
House of Commons, the branch of Parliament intended to 
represent the people, had become so unequal, irregular, and 
inadequate in its representation that by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, it hardly reflected the voice of the people and 
was separated from the interests of those it was supposed to 
represent.9 The House of Commons represented interests, not 
people, and if interests were not adequately represented, the 
English system of representation failed. The rallying cry 
preceding the American Revolution of “no taxation without 
representation” was an indictment of English constitutionalism 
and the importance of connecting legislative powers to a system 
of representation. If representation was to be constructed using 
electoral districts, they would have to be created using more 
systematic and equal criteria. 
Creating institutions of representation took place on two 
levels, national and state. At the national level, the Articles of 
Confederation created a system of representation that was more 
political than geographical.10 Under the Articles, state legislatures 
elected representatives instead of having communities or districts 
elect them. Representation was not proportionally allocated 
because each state was allowed to send no less than two and no 
more than seven representatives. On legislative matters, each 
state was given one vote and nine of thirteen votes were required 
to pass legislation. This fundamentally established representation 
of states as political bodies over representing people, a form of 
representation that continued in the Senate under the new 
Constitution. The lack of representing people or local 
communities would have to be addressed in the institutional 
design of the House. 
At the state level, five states, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New 
York, Vermont, and South Carolina, utilized electoral districts for 
representative purposes. For example, the 1776 New Jersey 
 
 9. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 
165 (1998). 
 10. REHFELD, supra note 8, at 78. 
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Constitution stipulated that counties choose representatives to 
the Assembly. The 1777 New York Constitution established 
representation for the various counties based on population, with 
a census taken every seven years and alterations to the number of 
representatives made based on population changes. This is to say, 
these state constitutions contained specific language requiring 
periodic adjustments to representation based on changes in 
population to maintain a system of proportionate and equal 
representation.11 The decision to use single-member districts with 
the number of representatives adjusted based on a decennial 
census was not something early Americans borrowed from 
English political thought and practice. As Jay K. Dow argued, “in 
the colonial era there was nothing that looked like the single-
member district system for the representation of individuals.”12 
The manner of understanding and constructing a system of 
representation in the House was not inherited from the British, 
but the result of American political and constitutional 
development based on the ambiguous language of Article I, 
Section 4. 
Single-member districts were not universally utilized by all 
states before or after ratification of the Constitution. While the 
idea and practice of using electoral districts occurred in many 
states prior to ratification, single-member districts coupled with 
the plurality rule was not formally adopted until decades later. At 
the national level, the idea of single-member districts emerged as 
a product of debates over representation, particularly in the 
House of Representatives. The manner of election determines the 
type of representative and manner of representation. During 
founding debates, both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were 
aware of how electoral rules would determine representation and 
the objectives of government. The Federalists’ vision of 
representative government recommended representative be 
elected using a plurality rule through large, heterogeneous, single-
member districts. The Anti-Federalists preferred electing 
representatives through majority rule in smaller, more 
homogenous, single-member districts.13 Both the Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists agreed that single-member districts were the 
 
 11. WOOD, supra note 9, at 172. 
 12. JAY K. DOW, ELECTING THE HOUSE: THE ADOPTION AND PERFORMANCE OF 
THE US SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICT SYSTEM 13 (2017). 
 13. Id. at 25. 
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preferred electoral configuration. However, they differed greatly 
on the details of district creation and election rules. The 
Constitution does little to resolve this debate because it does not 
provide specifics related to the manner of electing 
representatives. 
II. SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The requirement that states utilize a uniform method for 
selecting representatives first came from the 1842 Apportionment 
Act. In the process of reapportioning representatives in the 
House, a Whig-controlled Congress also stipulated that 
representatives be elected by single-member districts. Prior to 
this, states widely experimented with different methods of 
electing members to the House. The two most prominent methods 
were single-member districts, or a general ticket election wherein 
voters voted for an entire slate of representatives with as many 
names as there were seats. Some states, like New York and 
Pennsylvania, used multi-member districts in urban areas to 
provide additional representatives for the higher population. At 
the time of the 1842 apportionment, congressional power to 
require states use single-member districts was a major 
constitutional question, one that was the subject of extensive 
debate in Congress and elicited the first presidential signing 
statement of consequence when President Tyler questioned the 
constitutionality of the single-member district requirement.14 It is 
within these debates that political actors established the 
constitutionality of single-member districts through a more 
expansive construction of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause 
in Article I, Section 4. 
Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution contains the Times, 
Places, and Manner Clause, which reads: 
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State 
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time 
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places 
of chusing Senators. 
This Clause stipulates that state legislatures are the primary 
agents for regulating congressional elections within their state. 
 
 14. Id. at 111. 
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Congress, following their power to make or alter regulations, has 
intervened on certain occasions, but there is no clear 
constitutional text establishing the scope of congressional power 
within this political arena. Is congressional power to require 
single-member districts constitutionally justified by such phrases 
as “Times,” “Places,” or “Manner”? This question, and the 
meaning of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause, were central 
to the debates over the 1842 Apportionment Act and the 
congressional mandate that states utilize single-member districts. 
Beginning with the initial understanding of the Election 
Clause is necessary to fully understand the extent to which the 
Whig Party constructed new constitutional meaning to justify the 
congressional mandate for single-member districts.15 At the 
constitutional convention and during the ratification process, the 
Times, Places, and Manner Clause was understood to be a 
necessary, albeit limited means of ensuring the states did not 
disrupt or subvert the national government by failing to hold 
congressional elections. Critics of the Constitution feared the 
Clause was too ambiguous, and this ambiguity allowed Congress 
to assume power at the expense of the state governments. Two 
interrelated constitutional issues emerged during debates over the 
Times, Places, and Manner Clause: ensuring adequate 
representation and balancing power within a federal system. This 
section discusses the constitutional development of the Election 
Clause by explaining when and how Congress assumed power 
over federal elections and prohibited any election method other 
than single-member districts, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
position on Article I, Section 4 and electoral questions. 
A. Constitutional Convention and Ratification 
Delegates at the constitutional convention did not discuss the 
Election Clause at great lengths because it was introduced 
towards the conclusion of the convention. Initially, the language 
addressing legislative power was relatively broad, and very few 
specific details emerged. For example, the “Virginia Plan” 
empowered the legislative branch “to enjoy the Legislative Rights 
vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate 
in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in 
which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by 
 
 15. Ross, supra note 4, at 416–417. 
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the exercise of individual Legislation.”16 Charles Pinkney and 
John Rutledge opposed this proposal because the word 
“incompetent” was extremely vague and could potentially vest 
Congress with indefinite powers.17 Despite opposition, the 
proposition was quickly adopted two days later. This broad 
language, however, did not survive the Committee of Detail that 
was formed towards the conclusion of the Convention. 
On 6 August, once the delegates reconvened after an 
adjournment, the Committee of Detail replaced the broad grant 
of congressional powers with a list of enumerated powers. Among 
the powers was the Times, Places, and Manner Clause that 
initially read: “The times and places and manner of holding 
elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the 
Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them 
may, at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United 
States.”18 In the subsequent days, the delegates immediately 
began considering the Committee’s provisions and wasted no time 
debating each enumerated power now granted to the legislative 
branch, including the Times, Places, and Manner Clause. 
On 9 August, the preliminary Times, Places, and Manner 
Clause was addressed, and discussion proceeded by separating it 
into its two parts: 1) the power granted to state legislatures to 
“prescribe” the times, places, and manner of holding elections and 
2) the power granted to the national government to alter the 
election provisions made by the states. Debate over the Clause 
centered on the nature of federalism under the new Constitution. 
Charles Pinkney and John Rutledge defended the states’ power 
and role in the election process by proposing to eliminate the 
entire second part of the Clause. They believed the states “could 
& must be relied on in such cases.” Conversely, Nathaniel 
Gorham defended the national legislature’s ability to alter state 
election law, comparing the proposed power with that of the 
British Parliament. Building on Gorham’s position, Madison 
challenged Pinckney and Rutledge’s supposition by expressing his 
own reservations about relying on the states for election purposes. 
The “necessity of a Gen Gov,” he argued, “supposes that the State 
Legislatures will sometimes fail to refuse to consult the common 
 
 16. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
31 (1987). 
 17. Id. at 43. 
 18. Id. at 387. 
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interest at the expence [sic] of their local conveniency [sic] or 
prejudices.”19 To substantiate his position, Madison connected the 
mode of selecting members of Congress with the nature of 
representation and its relation to policy preferences in the House. 
If a state legislature had a particular policy preference, it could 
manipulate electoral rules to favor particular candidates, and any 
inequalities in representation at the state level would be 
transferred to the national legislature. Without a safeguard on 
state power, state legislatures could influence representation in 
the House by manipulating the times, places, and manner of 
holding elections. In other words, the House would become more 
representative of the state legislatures rather than representative 
of the people. 
After addressing the danger of giving plenary power to the 
states over elections, Madison explained how the institutional 
design of the proposed Congress would make power over 
elections safe at the national level. There would be no danger in 
giving Congress power to alter state election laws because of the 
members of Congress. Under the proposed system, senators were 
elected by state legislature and members of the House elected by 
the same people who elected members of the state legislatures. If 
those who advocated for state authority, like Pinkney and 
Rutledge, had confidence in the state legislatures to not abuse the 
power of regulating elections, then they must also have 
confidence that those same people would elect individuals to the 
Senate who would likewise not abuse the power granted to the 
national legislature. Therefore, reasoned Madison, congressional 
power over the times, places, and manner of elections to Congress 
was both necessary and safe. 
Following Madison’s defense of the Clause, Rufus King and 
Gouverneur Morris made final arguments for the propriety of 
granting the national legislature power over elections by raising 
further concerns about states abusing their power. In particular, 
they both expressed concern that the states would disrupt the 
election process by making “false returns and then make no 
provisions for new elections.” In this way, their concern was 
slightly different from Madison’s. Madison feared that, without 
the intervention of Congress, states could manipulate the election 
for their own policy purposes; King and Morris feared that states 
 
 19. Id. at 423. 
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could disrupt the election process to subvert the national 
government’s power and eliminate the entire House of 
Representatives by not electing members to it. In light of these 
arguments, the motion to eliminate congressional power over 
elections did not prevail, as even those who had “sufficient 
confidence in the State Legislatures” believed “it might be best to 
retain the clause.”20 The delegates only made minor adjustments 
to the Clause’s language after deciding to maintain the two 
sections. The new Clause was understood to remedy both 
Madison’s and King and Morris’s concerns in that the national 
government was capable of altering state election provisions only 
in the case of electoral manipulations or refusal to hold elections. 
With these minor alterations, the new Clause passed 
unanimously. From this accepted language, states were initially 
understood to have more control over federal elections, and there 
was no constitutional language or identifiable preference for the 
use of single-member districts. 
On 14 September, towards the end of the convention, The 
Times, Places, and Manner Clause was changed one more time 
before the final version was accepted. As the delegates voted on 
the final version of the proposed constitution, the phrase, “except 
as to the places of choosing Senators” was unanimously added to 
“exempt the seats of Govt in the States from the power of 
Congress.”21 Otherwise, Congress could determine where state 
legislatures could meet and where states could locate their 
capitals. During the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison 
further explained the necessity of this addition: 
[I]f Congress could fix the place of choosing the senators, it 
might compel the state legislatures to elect them in a different 
place from that of their usual sessions, which would produce 
some inconvenience, and was not necessary for the object of 
regulating elections. But it was necessary to give the general 
government a controul over the time and manner of choosing 
the senators, to prevent its own dissolution.22 
The exemption of “place” for senatorial elections coincided 
with the federal intention of the Clause. The House of 
Representatives was designed to “derive its powers from the 
 
 20. Id. at 424. 
 21. Id. at 635. 
 22. Debate in the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 311 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
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people of America;” the Senate would “derive its powers from the 
States, as political and coequal societies.”23 Again, the Times, 
Places, and Manner Clause, ensured House elections did not 
become creatures of the state legislatures, disrupting the 
“national” character of the House.  The additional phrase also 
ensured the Senate would be elected by state legislatures, which 
maintained the “federal” character of the Senate. 
While there was little debate throughout the convention, 
during the ratification process, The Times, Places, and Manner 
Clause, was a source of contention. The Anti-Federalists and the 
Federalists both addressed the ambiguities of Article I, Section 4, 
with the Anti-Federalists providing a more comprehensive 
critique of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause than what was 
given at the convention. For the Anti-Federalists, the Clause 
exemplified aspects of the Constitution that could be broadly 
interpreted to subvert state sovereignty and eliminate federalism 
from the proposed system. Federal Farmer constructed a critique 
of the Clause that mirrored Madison’s defense of it at the 
convention. Madison had argued for the necessity of the Clause 
based on his fear the state legislatures would manipulate electoral 
laws to their advantage in selecting members to the House. The 
Anti-Federalist author, however, inverted the argument: “The 
branches of the legislature are essential parts of the fundamental 
compact, and ought to be so fixed by the people, that the 
legislature cannot alter itself by modifying the election of its own 
members.”24 And, because of Article I, Section 4’s vagueness, “the 
general legislature may . . . evidently so regulate elections as to 
secure the choice of any particular description of men.”25 Given 
the broad language in the Clause, the general Anti-Federalist 
charge centered on the danger to their understanding of 
representation in that the national government could manipulate 
election laws so as to prohibit the people, particularly the “people 
who live scattered in the inland towns,” from electing 
representatives. There was a fear that Congress could 
constitutionally establish electoral laws that only allowed “a few 
men in a city” to be represented. That is, the Anti-Federalists 
 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 243–44 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 
2000). 
 24. Federal Farmer, No. 3 (1787), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 249 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralpher Lerner eds., 1987). 
 25. Id. 
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feared Congress would make the House more aristocratic rather 
than democratic. 
This concern over representation and the Times, Places, and 
Manner Clause was repeated by Brutus. Fearing that Congress 
would “alter itself by modifying the election of its own members 
at will and pleasure,” he argued that the Clause was dangerous to 
equality and representation in that “[w]hen a people once resign 
the privilege of a fair election, they clearly have none left worth 
contenting for.” The result of these unfair elections would lead to 
a “weakness of the representation” because the ambiguous power 
granted in the Clause would allow Congress to “make the whole 
state one district, and direct, that the capital (the city of New-
York, for instance) shall be the place for holding the election; the 
consequence would be, that none but men of the most elevated 
rank in society would attend, and they would as certainly choose 
men of their own class . . . .” Representation in the House would 
not be representative of the people but “one tenth of part of the 
people who actually vote.”26 The Anti-Federalists believed the 
Constitution should limit the new national government, and the 
Times, Places, and Manner Clause dangerously empowered the 
government at the expense of equality and fair representation. 
For the Anti-Federalists, Article I, Section 4 was a key to 
institutionalizing fair congressional representation, as they were 
acutely aware that electoral laws would determine the nature of 
representation in the House of Representatives. They proposed 
that the Constitution require states use a district system to ensure 
equal and fair representation. As Federal Farmer described: 
To secure a representation from all parts of the community, in 
making the constitution, we ought to provide for dividing each 
state into a proper number of districts, and for confining the 
electors in each district to the choice of some men, who shall 
have a permanent interest and residence in it; and also for this 
essential object, that the representative elected shall have a 
majority of the votes of those electors who shall attend and give 
their votes.27 
Brutus likewise argued for the district system: “Provision 
should have been made for marking out the states into districts, 
and for choosing, by a majority of votes, a person out of each of 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Federal Farmer, supra note 24. 
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them of permanent property and residence in the district which 
he was to represent.”28 On 12 January 1788, Federal Farmer again 
challenged the “ambiguous and very defective” article and 
proposed the Constitution provide for representation based on 
small, single-member districts with representatives chosen by a 
majority rather than plurality of voters. Otherwise, “we have no 
security against deceptions, influence and corruption.”29 The only 
way to secure fair representation was to “fix elections on a proper 
footing, and to render tolerably equal and secure the federal 
representation, but by increasing the representation, so as to have 
one representative for each district, in which the electors may 
conveniently meet in one place, and at one time, and chuse by a 
majority.”30 For the Anti-Federalists, the proposed Constitution 
did not provide adequate or explicit means of securing fair 
representation of the people in the House of Representatives. 
The Anti-Federalists’ appealed less to state sovereignty and 
more to explicit constitutional constructions for a solution to the 
problem of electoral rules and representation in the House. In 
particular, Federal Farmer advocated for a stricter delineation in 
power between the national and state government. Keeping with 
the federal spirit of Article I, Section 4, he argued Congress 
should be given the enumerated power to establish electoral 
districts within a state and to “regulate, from time to time, the 
extent of the districts so as to keep the representatives 
proportionate to the number of inhabitants in the several parts of 
the country.”31 Moreover, because not all regulations related to 
elections can be enumerated, those incapable of being fixed by the 
Constitution should be left to the states, reserving powers to them. 
Finally, Congress should be given expressed powers to regulate 
the elections laws reserved to the states only when the state 
neglects to make them. In this way, the federal spheres of 
constitutional powers would be further defined and clarified, 
minimizing the prospect of abuse by both the national 
government and state governments. 
 
 28. Brutus, No. 4, (1787), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 251 (Philip 
B. Kurland & Ralpher Lerner eds., 1987). 
 29. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE 105 (Michael 
Zuckert & David Webb eds., 2009). 
 30. Id. at 107. 
 31. Id. at 111. 
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In response to the Anti-Federalists’ publications, Hamilton 
discussed and defended the Times, Places, and Manner Clause in 
three separate articles written for The Federalist.32 In general, he 
believed no other article in the Constitution was “more 
completely defensible” than this one because it provided 
Congress with “the means of its own preservation” and “every just 
reasoner will at first sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in 
the work of the Convention; and will disapprove every deviation 
from it.”33 Similar to discussion in the constitutional convention, 
Hamilton argued the power to regulate elections was essential, 
and the real question to be discussed was where to position this 
power. He defended placing power over elections with the 
national government rather than giving it solely to the states. The 
propensity to abuse such power was much greater if given to the 
states than the national government because “it is more rational 
to hazard [abuses of power] where the power would naturally be 
placed, than where it would unnaturally be placed.”34 More to the 
point, if the power over elections was a necessary means of self-
preservation for the national government, propriety dictated that 
the national government be entrusted with the power for its own 
preservation rather than granting it to the care of the states. 
Like the Anti-Federalists, Hamilton focused on the House of 
Representatives as the primary target for attempts to abuse the 
power over elections. Because of institutional design, the Senate 
was insulated from abuse due to the rotation of elections as the 
entire senate was never up for election. As a result, “a temporary 
combination of a few states, to intermit the appointment of 
Senators, could neither annul the existence nor impair the activity 
of the body.” The House of Representatives, however, was 
susceptible because if the “State Legislatures were to be invested 
with an exclusive power of regulating these elections, every period 
of making them would be a delicate crisis in the national 
situation.”35 There was more at stake than just the danger of states 
disrupting the House by electing representative. Without the 
Clause, the national character of the House of Representatives 
was also in question because the “scheme of separate 
 
 32. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 59, 60, 61 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 
2000). 
 34. Id. at 380. 
 35. Id. at 381. 
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confederacies, which will always multiply the chances of ambition, 
will be a never failing bait to all such influential characters in the 
State administrations as are capable of preferring their own 
emolument and advancement to the public weal.”36 The Clause 
was necessary to ensure the House of Representatives maintained 
its national character and represent, as Madison described in 
Federalist No. 39, the individual citizens in their individual 
capacities.37 The Clause was an important protection of federalism 
within the newly proposed system because it would protect the 
national character of the House and provide for national 
representation in Congress to balance the state based equal 
representation in the Senate. 
Similar arguments were made in ratification debates 
throughout the states. In general, if any alterations to Article I, 
Section 4 were suggested, they primarily sought to make 
Congress’s power over elections more limited and explicit by 
adding language that would only allow Congress to exercise their 
power when states failed to hold elections.38 After ratification 
debates, no official alterations were made to the Clause, and the 
dominant understanding was settled on the presumption that 
Congress would only exercise its limited power over elections in 
instances of self-preservation. 
This understanding that emerged from ratification debates 
changed during the 1800s, as political actors attempted to create 
a uniform system for electing representatives through 
constitutional amendment. These efforts were often tied to the 
Electoral College and the method of allocating votes. Under the 
proposed amendments, members of the House would be elected 
using the district method, representatives and Electoral College 
electors would be selected from the same district, with the 
remaining two electors selected using the same method as electing 
senators. John Nicholas, a Democratic-Republican from Virginia, 
introduced the first of these proposals in 1800. His resolution went 
 
 36. Id. at 382. 
 37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 244 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 
2000). 
 38. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE 
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2010). Meier points out that, in the Virginia ratifying 
convention, Madison “had defended the provision as it stood and suggested that it already 
gave Congress the power that Massachusetts and New Hampshire wanted to make explicit. 
Apparently, he saw no need to change Article I, Section 4, even to remedy the discontent 
it had caused in many state conventions” Id. at 448–49. 
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to a committee, which rejected and returned the proposal and it 
never went to chamber for debate. The committee’s 
recommendation for rejection assumed the resolution 
superfluous because Congress already had the power to regulate 
congressional elections. As early as 1800, understanding of the 
Elections Clause had changed, and it was assumed Congress had 
power to determine the method of electing representatives.39 
Throughout the 1810s and 1820s, multiple attempts at amending 
the Constitution to require districts and prohibit general ticket 
elections passed the Senate but died in the House.40 The lack of 
congressional amendment meant that the meaning of the Election 
Clause was still unsettled, and any understanding of congressional 
power that required states to adopt a particular electoral system 
never translated to a legislative outcome.41 
The meaning of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause was 
not seriously contested again until 1842. With the adoption of the 
Constitution, the Clause was understood to provide Congress 
with regulatory power over elections in the event of states failing 
to hold them. However, this initial constitutional understanding 
was challenged and a new constitutional construction was 
developed that expanded the role of Congress in determining 
state election law. For the first time, Congress interpreted its 
power in Article 1, Section 4 as a grant of power requiring states 
to use single-member districts in elections for the House of 
Representatives. 
B. CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND THE 1842 
APPORTIONMENT ACT 
After the 1840 Census, the Select Committee on the 
Apportionment of Representatives set a ratio of one 
representative for every 68,000, which reduced the total number 
of representatives in the House. While this reduction was 
unprecedented, a later amendment was added that required states 
to adopt single-member districts for House elections. Like the 
reduction in representatives, this was the first time Congress 
proposed to require that states adopt a uniform system for 
electing representatives to the House. The districting requirement 
became Section 2 of the Apportionment Act, producing debate 
 
 39. DOW, supra note 12, at 113. 
 40. Id. at 113–16. 
 41. See, e.g., ZAGARRI, supra note 3. 
ROSS & ANDERSON_DRAFT 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/18 1:47 PM 
2018] SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS 279 
 
over the meaning of the Times, Manner, and Places Clause and 
the constitutionality of Section 2.42 
Quickly after Section 2 was introduced, representatives 
questioned the constitutionality of requiring that states utilize a 
particular method for electing representatives. Rep. Joseph R. 
Underwood (W-Ky) believed Section 2 “proposed to Congress to 
do that which it had no constitutional power to do, viz: direct the 
State Legislatures how to act in the matter of State elections to 
Congress.”43 William L. Goggin (W-Va), in addressing the 
constitutionality of Section 2, read extensively from Madison’s 
notes at the Constitutional Convention and relied on the 
interpretation that Article 1, Section 4 was “intended only to be 
used in the last resort, in case the States should neglect or refuse 
to act, in order that the wheels of the General Government might 
not stop.”44 Rep. Walter T. Colquitt (D-Ga) denounced the 
constitutionality of Section 2 by emphasizing how the districting 
requirement conflicted with other aspects of the Constitution. 
Section 2 did not relate to “time” and “places” in Article I, Section 
4, only “manner.” However, Section 2 unconstitutionally added 
qualifications to members of the House because it requires 
representatives to live in the districts from which they are to be 
elected. “Manner” cannot be construed to mean this. The 
qualifications for members of the House was already established 
in Article I, and Section 2 unconstitutionally adds to these 
qualifications. Section 2 also unconstitutionally abridged voting 
rights because the Constitution states that representatives are to 
be chosen by the people of the state, and each voter is allowed to 
vote for every representative within a state. If the districting plan 
were adopted, representatives represented only a fraction of the 
state, and suffrage rights were limited to only voting for one 
representative rather than the full slate allotted to the state.45 
“Certainly it must be a far-fetched construction,” Rep. Colquitt 
argued, “to say that the manner of holding an election, gives 
power to say who shall be the voters at the election, where they 
shall live, and how many they may legally support!”46 Opponents 
of Section 2 relied on a limited reading of Article I, Section 4 that 
 
 42. Id. at 124. 
 43. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 445 (1842). 
 44. Id. at 447. 
 45. Id. at 446. 
 46. Id. at 447. 
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lodged power over elections primarily with the states rather than 
Congress. 
Rep. William L. Goggin (W-Va), although opposed to 
Section 2, provided arguments for the constitutionality of 
congressional power to district. During his reading of Madison’s 
notes to oppose Section 2, he conceded that “in strictness, 
Congress did possess the power to district the states,” but 
exercising this power was an “odious use of authority.”47 Thomas 
Arnold (W-Tn) likewise interpreted Madison as an authoritative 
source that established congressional control over the subject of 
districting. Garrett Davis (W-Ky) granted Congress power to 
district states based on the language of Article 1, Section 4. The 
ability to require districts surely is within the powers prescribed 
to Congress by the words “make” and “alter.” If the states, under 
Article I, Section 4, may decide to utilize either the general ticket 
system or the district system, Congress is well within its power to 
“totally and wholly” make and alter state regulations. Sampson 
Butler (D-SC) addressed arguments that congressional power 
over the “manner” of elections did not extend to requiring states 
adopt a particular electoral method. Since the Constitution grants 
congressional power over the time, place, and manner of 
elections, “what plain, unsophisticated man, reading [Article I, 
Section 4], would for a moment doubt the power of Congress to 
control the whole subject, whenever, in its discretion, it shall see 
fit to do so?”48 This meaning of the text is so unambiguous “so as 
to silence all caviling.”49 
The Whig majority in both the House and the Senate 
narrowly passed the Apportionment Act with Section 2, then only 
needing President Tyler’s signature. President Tyler, however, 
questioned the constitutionality of the districting amendment and 
attached a signing statement to the passed legislation. Despite 
questioning its constitutionality, Tyler opted for a signing 
statement rather than vetoing the bill because of an overarching 
doubt that the “Chief Magistrate ought to outweigh the solemnly 
pronounced opinion of the representatives of the people and of 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Cong. Globe, supra note 43, at 319. 
 49. Id. 
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the states.”50 Regarding the districting amendment, Tyler 
explained that the question of congressional power “to alter State 
regulations respecting the manner of holding elections for 
Representatives is clear, but its power to command the States to 
make new regulations or alter their existing regulations is the 
question upon which I have felt deep and strong doubts.”51 The 
28th Congress faced controversy because of the districting 
requirement, as four states, Georgia, Missouri, Mississippi, and 
New Hampshire continued to elect representatives using the 
general ticket system. However, by the 30th Congress, all states 
with more than one representative utilized single-member 
districts for elections. 
Throughout debates on the 1842 Apportionment Act, both 
sides utilized arguments from founding and ratification debates to 
substantiate their claims regarding the constitutionality of Section 
2. The general consensus during founding debates favored states 
exercising power over elections with the national government 
only intervening in the event states failed to hold elections. 
However, this constructed understanding shifted towards Article 
I, Section 4 being understood as granting Congress power over 
elections, even at the expense of state authority over the matter. 
This constitutional construction favoring congressional power 
underlined the passage of the 1842 Apportionment Act, and it 
established precedent for Congress taking a more active role in 
the making and altering election law. 
C. POST-1842 DEVELOPMENTS 
After the 1842 Apportionment Act, Congress continued to 
exercise its power over House elections. The 1850 Apportionment 
Act did not include the districting requirement. However, this 
exclusion was not because the power to require districts was in 
question. The requirement was again added to the 1862, 1872, 
1882, 1891, 1901, and 1911 Apportionment Acts, with Congress 
including additional requirements to the districting process, such 
as districts being composed of contiguous and compact territory 
and the population of districts being as equal as possible. 
Throughout the debates over these apportionment acts, 
 
 50. John Tyler, Special Message (Jun. 25, 1842), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds.), http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=67545. 
 51. Id. 
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congressional power to require districts was never challenged. 
Rather than discussing the meaning of “times, places, and 
manner,” Congress exercised their extensive powers over 
elections by establishing further requirements for drawing single-
member districts. Following the 1842 Apportionment Act, 
congressional power to require a specific electoral system was 
seemingly settled because there were no serious objections to 
districting mandate and subsequent prescriptions for drawing 
districts. 
During the 1920s, controversy over apportionment emerged 
leading to the Supreme Court’s involvement with constitutional 
questions related to reapportionment. No apportionment act was 
passed following the 1920 census on account of two important 
developments, population shifts from rural to urban areas and 
World War I. For the first time in history, the census revealed that 
more individuals lived in urban areas than rural. This caused great 
concern over rural representation if the equal population 
requirement had to be met, as rural districts would be 
consolidated to allow for an increase in the number of urban 
districts. The War also skewed census data because much of the 
population was away from their home states in support of war 
efforts, often concentrated in the larger, industrial cities of the 
country.52 Congressional failure to pass apportionment legislation 
meant the 1911 Apportionment Act remained in effect. In 
anticipation for the 1930 census, Congress passed the 
Reapportionment Act of 1929 that shifted apportionment power 
from Congress to the executive and retained the districting 
requirement without the regulations for how to draw districts. 
That is, the Act was silent on drawing districts that were compact, 
contiguous, and of equal population, meaning it did not 
specifically repeal their use.53 
The absence of any constitutional requirements or 
congressional districting standards meant states varied in their 
practice of drawing districts. Voters in Mississippi filed suit, 
objecting to a gerrymandered and malapportioned district. In 
Wood v. Broom, petitioners argued that Mississippi had not 
conformed to the requirements that districts be of contiguous and 
compact territory, as well as of equal population. However, these 
 
 52. DOW, supra note 12, at 160. 
 53. Id. at 175. 
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requirements were based on the 1911 Apportionment Act, not the 
1929 Act. The question before the Supreme Court was if the 
requirements from previous apportionment acts were still in 
effect, even if not specified in subsequent legislation. The Court 
reasoned that apportionment requirements expired once a new 
census was taken and only apply to the reapportionment “to 
which they expressly related.”54 Importantly, Justice Holmes 
reasoned that “[i]t was manifestly the intention of the Congress 
not to reenact the provisions as to compactness, continuity, and 
equality in population with respect to the districts to be created 
pursuant to the reapportionment under the Act of 1929.” There 
was no question regarding congressional authority in requiring 
states adopt a particular electoral method. Congress had the 
power to require states to utilize the districting method and 
adhere to particular requirements for districts. If the 1929 
Apportionment Act failed to specify requirements, “the omission 
was deliberate;” if Congress had power to make requirements, 
they also had power to omit them.55 Based on this decision, the 
Court maintained congressional power over elections, reaffirming 
the constitutional construction developed in 1842. 
Wood v. Broom was only the beginning of the Court dealing 
with electoral issues and the meaning of Article I, Section 4, 
especially as it related to the Fourteenth Amendment. Colegrove 
v. Green was similar to Wood, with voters challenging the 
constitutionality of Illinois’ disproportionally populated districts. 
The state legislature had not redistricted for 40 years, despite 
large differences in populations that were shown in multiple 
censuses. The petitioners challenged that these disproportionate 
districts violated the equality of their votes. The Court, however, 
rejected this argument and affirmed the state’s authority to not 
redistrict and congressional powers over the political process of 
reapportionment. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter 
adopted the position of judicial restraint in the realm of electoral 
issues: 
The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State 
legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample 
powers of Congress. The Constitution has many commands 
that are not enforceable by courts because they clearly fall 
 
 54. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7 (1932). 
 55. Id. 
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outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial 
action.56 
However, in his dissent, Justice Black argued that the 
substantially unequal populations in each district reduced the 
effectiveness of individual votes in the more populated districts, 
which violated the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Without the equal population requirement, the average 
population deviation between states dramatically increased, and 
there was little incentive for members of Congress to reinstate the 
requirement if it meant losing their seat due to malapportioned 
districts.57 Malapportioned districts would not be addressed until 
the judiciary created the redistricting revolution. 
Baker v. Carr58 and Wesberry v. Sanders59 marked a shift for 
the Supreme Court from Justice Frankfurter’s reliance on 
Congress to deal with these political questions to Justice Black’s 
argument that malapportionment violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In Baker v. Carr, the argument focused on how a 
lack of redistricting in Tennessee led to a “debasement of their 
votes” for candidates in the state assembly under the Due Process 
and Equal Protections Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 
The Court’s rejection of the lower court’s decision, which 
dismissed the case based on justiciability, provides insight into the 
justices’ desire to establish jurisdiction in the realm of electoral 
questions. To do so, the Court established a list of factors that 
determine if a case constitutes a nonjusticiable political question. 
However, considerations of state sovereignty and federalism, 
prominent aspects of previous debates over the meaning of 
Article I, Section 4, were absent from the list of factors. Building 
on the decision in Baker, in Wesberry v. Sanders, the Court 
extended the right to an equally weighted vote through equal 
apportionment to federal congressional districts, forcing Georgia 
to reapportion its House districts. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Black argued Article 1, Section 2’s requirement that the “People 
of the Several States” elect members to the House meant that 
each individuals vote must carry the same weight relative to other 
 
 56. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 57. See ERIK J. ENGSTROM, PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150–58 (2013). 
 58. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 59. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) 
 60. Baker, supra note 58, at 188. 
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voters. Justice Harlan dissented, following Justice Frankfurter’s 
Colegrove position that malapportionment was a political matter 
better left to Congress. He also invoked Article I, Section 4 in that 
Congress is given power to apportion representatives, while states 
are empowered to determine the manner of drawing districts. 
Importantly, although the Court asserted its jurisdiction over 
electoral questions, these cases did not question congressional 
authority to require single-member districts. 
The Court went a step further in Reynolds v. Sims, when it 
upheld a district court’s order to place a temporary redistricting 
plan into effect when the Alabama legislature failed to provide a 
plan that fit the court’s order. The Supreme Court declared that 
all legislative districts had to be apportioned according to 
population, striking down Alabama’s plan to give every county at 
least one state representative and one state senator no matter the 
population. Although the question in Reynolds concerned equal 
representation under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
referenced single- and multi-member districts in a neutral manner 
while building a hypothetical situation: 
Single-member districts may be the rule in one state, while 
another State might desire to achieve some flexibility by 
creating multi-member or floterial districts. Whatever the 
means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be 
substantial equality of population among the various districts, 
so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight 
to that of any other citizen in the State.61 
Reynolds merely required that legislatures make a 
substantial effort to reapportion using equal population 
districting. This hypothetical situation included state discretion 
over the method of electing representatives. 
Following 1911, apportionment acts did not include the 
requirement for single-member district elections. This absence 
allowed states to use alternative methods. In 1932, Missouri, 
Kentucky, Virginia, Minnesota, and North Dakota elected 
members to the House using at-large elections. From 1942-1946, 
Arizona used at-large elections, as did New Mexico and Hawaii in 
1942, and New Mexico, Hawaii, and Alabama elected at-large 
representatives in 1962.62 With the Court determining 
 
 61. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964). 
 62. CONG. Q., Guide to US Elections 1170–72 (1975). 
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apportionment cases were judiciable, in 1967, as in 1842, Congress 
once again exercised their power under Article I, Section 4 to 
address the manner of electing representatives by passing 
legislation that prohibited at-large and multi-member district 
elections, thereby establishing single-member districts as the 
preferred electoral method. Unlike 1842, there was very little 
debate over the districting mandate and relatively no questions of 
congressional power under the Constitution to do so. The only 
major discussion involved the logistics of applying the 
requirement to Hawaii and New Mexico, the only states not using 
single-member districts. Senator Howard Baker (R-TN) 
expressed hope that the districting mandate would “effectuate the 
principles of one man, one vote,” and “the concept of single-
member districts . . . has been a nonpartisan undertaking by 
Members on both sides of the aisle.”63 Returning to the 
requirement first established in 1842, he further argued, provided 
“maximum protection of the rights of all people and maximum 
responsiveness to their needs.”64 The 1967 district requirement 
can be understood as an extension of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 
as there was concern that southern states would utilize at-large 
elections to dilute minority voting.65 The development of the 
Supreme Court’s malapportionment decisions and Congress’s 
power over the manner of elections produced the prohibition of 
alternative election methods other than single-member districts. 
After the 1967 requirement for single-member districts, the 
Court continued to strengthen the doctrine of equal population 
apportionment without addressing the use of alternative election 
methods. Responding to discriminatory voting requirements 
against African Americans in the south, Allen v. State Board of 
Elections extended the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 
voting to include “all action necessary to make a vote effective.”66 
Importantly, in his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Court’s 
reliance on the text of the Voting Rights Act provided no 
guidance for determining the constitutionality of different 
electoral methods, including single-member districts. During the 
 
 63. 133 CONG. REC. 34,037 (1967). 
 64. Id. at 34, 366. 
 65. See QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT, 1965–1990 (Chandler David & Bernard Grofman eds, 1994). 
 66. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 563–70 (1969) (reviewing the 
statutory language of the Voting Rights Act and applying it to states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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1970s, the Court also extended the requirement of equal 
population apportionment to overturn partisan gerrymandering 
because it resulted in excessive population deviations between 
districts.67 The justices further strengthened the equal 
representation standard in Karcher v. Daggett by requiring that 
redistricting consist of more than just equal apportionment of 
populations. The Court struck down New Jersey’s congressional 
redistricting plan that clearly favored Democrats. Although the 
districts had almost equal populations, the Court stated that the 
state bore the burden of proving that the districts had been drawn 
in “good-faith”, which required that any differences in 
populations between districts were shown by the state to be 
necessary.68 During this line of cases, the justices did not explicitly 
question the accepted practice of using single-member districts in 
regards to providing adequate representation of various interests. 
In 1986, the Supreme Court was presented with Thornburg v. 
Gingles, which addressed racially motivated gerrymandering at 
the state level in areas with multi-member districts. The North 
Carolina General Assembly had apportioned its seats using both 
single and multi-member districts strategically to fracture the 
African-American vote. This apportionment scheme was 
challenged under the Voting Rights Act and overturned. Relying 
on the text of the Voting Rights Act, the Court argued it was 
necessary to look at the “totality of circumstances” and found that 
the use of multi-member districts had in effect denied African 
Americans the ability to vote as a cohesive bloc.69 Despite the 
opportunity to affirm or deny the constitutionality of both multi- 
or single-member districts, the Court relied on text of the Voting 
Rights Act to declare that the use of multi-member districts was 
aimed at discrimination against African-Americans and thus was 
struck down. That is, the justices neither affirmed nor questioned 
the state’s general use of both single- and multi-member districts 
for elections to the state legislature. The constitutionality of multi-
member districts was only challenged when combined with 
questions of equality of voting and racial gerrymandering. Absent 
issues of racial vote dilution, the Court provided no indication as 
to the constitutionality of alternative election methods. 
 
 67. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
 68. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
 69. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
ROSS & ANDERSON_DRAFT 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/18 1:47 PM 
288 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:261 
 
The Court was later presented with an opportunity to affirm 
the constitutionality of single- or multi-member districts in Holder 
v. Hall, when voters defeated a petition to expand a county 
commission to five members elected from single-member districts 
and a chairman elected at large. The National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenged that this 
expansion was necessary because African-American votes were 
diluted under the current structure, while a larger commission 
would allow for the election of an African-American commission 
member. The Court ruled against the NAACP, claiming that 
racially motivated gerrymandering required strict scrutiny, which 
the NAACP’s argument did not meet. In the process of this case, 
the justices reaffirmed the Court’s neutrality on the 
constitutionality of single- and multi-member districts when 
Justice Clarence Thomas in his concurring opinion cited Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Allen v. State Board of Elections: 
[T]he Voting Rights Act supplies no rule for a court to rely 
upon in deciding, for example, whether a multimember at-large 
system of election is to be preferred to a single-member district 
system; that is, whether one provides a more “effective” vote 
than another.70 
Justice Thomas continued by citing a dissent by Justice Felix 
Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr, stating that the choice between 
single- and multi-member districts is “inherently a political one.” 
However, he also questioned preferences for using single-member 
districting as an electoral method because the Constitution does 
not explicitly recognize this practice: 
It should be apparent, however, that there is no principle 
inherent in our constitutional system, or even in the history of 
the Nation’s electoral practices, that makes single-member 
districts the “proper” mechanism for electing representatives 
to governmental bodies or for giving “undiluted” effect to the 
votes of a numerical minority.71 
Further cases continued to focus on the constitutionality of 
racial gerrymandering while not addressing the general use of a 
particular voting method, with the Court overturning multiple 
 
 70. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 896 (1994). 
 71. Id. at 897. 
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attempts to create African-American majority districts while 
relying on the use of minority packed single-member districts.72 
Despite the multiple different electoral, redistricting, and 
gerrymandering cases that the Supreme Court has heard, never 
once have the justices declared the constitutionality single-
member districts and congressional power to require states to 
adopt a particular method for electing representatives. Although 
the Court asserted its jurisdiction over questions of racial and 
political gerrymandering, it has thus far sidestepped the issues of 
whether or not single-member districts are constitutional. This 
may be because the Court has never seen a direct challenge to 
their constitutionality, or it may be because the Court prefers to 
maintain a neutral stance. Overall, the Supreme Court has never 
addressed the question of alternative voting systems73 and left 
unanswered the question concerning the constitutionality of 
single-member districts, which raises the possibility that future 
cases may address this glaring hole in judicial jurisprudence 
concerning electoral issues. Reliance on the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, however, limits our ability to fully understand the 
relationship between single-member districts and Article I, 
Section 4 because the broader historical meaning, development, 
and political application of the Election Clause emerged within 
Congress, not the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Members of the House of Representatives are elected using 
single-member districts and the plurality rule, and these electoral 
rules have become deeply entrenched in American politics. This 
institutional feature, however, is not mandated by the 
Constitution. The decision to utilize this electoral arrangement 
was ultimately decided by Congress. The congressional process of 
accepting this configuration had substantive effects on the 
concepts of federalism and representation. Members of Congress 
constructed constitutional meaning related to the Times, Places, 
and Manner Clause in the process of legitimizing the single-
member district requirement during debates over the 1842 
 
 72 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 
(1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); and Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
 73. Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1995). 
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Apportionment Act. During this process, the Clause was 
understood broadly, allowing Congress to require states adopt a 
particular method of electing representations and settling the 
meaning of Article I, Section 4. Subsequent political 
developments firmly lodged this power over elections with 
Congress at the expense of a decentralized process that allowed 
states to determine the method of electing representatives. 
The Supreme Court has decided, and continues to decide, 
important cases involving single-member districts and the process 
of drawing congressional districts. Yet, the Court has never 
established the constitutionality of a particular electoral voting 
system. This leaves the use of single-member districts as the 
accepted form of electing representatives deeply entrenched with 
Congress and the political process by which the meaning of the 
Elections Clause was constructed. This article attempts to fill an 
important void in constitutional development left by the Court’s 
lack of jurisprudence by focusing on the origin and 
constitutionality of single-member districts in American political 
development. As the Court currently reassesses the 
constitutionality of processes for drawing district lines, it may be 
time to also reassess the use of single-member districts in general 
and Congress’ power to require a specific electoral method for 
selecting representatives, especially if the representation 
provided by a system of single-member districts is deemed 
unsatisfactory and insufficient. The continued use of the single-
member districts system is ultimately a political choice, a choice 
that can be reconsidered by the states, Congress, or through 
constitutional amendment. 
 
